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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
county need not be proper in fact. In Reliable Displays Corp. v. Maro
Industries, Inc.,56 the Supreme Court, Westchester County, rejected
this interpretation of the statute.57 It held that the county specified by
the defendant must also in fact be a proper one. The court added that
the only proper place of venue was Queens County, but inasmuch as
the defendant made no attempt to transfer the case there, the court
declined to so order5 8
The decision of the court is clearly correct. If a plaintiff chooses
an improper venue, the defendant should not be permitted to change
the venue to an equally improper county. The defendant's remedy
should be limited to transferring the case to a proper county.
ARTICLE I I- POOR PERSONS
CPLR 1102: City is not responsible for costs of publication in matri-
monial action.
The costs involved in civil proceedings can operate as an effective
bar to an indigent seeking judicial relief. The Legislature has at-
tempted to meet this problem through the passage of in forma pauperis
legislation. These statutes are usually limited in scope. In recent years,
however, the courts have expanded the effect of these statutes by con-
struing them liberally and have provided additional protection for the
poor by similar construction of the Constitution. The courts have al-
lowed an indigent to proceed with his action on the grounds of due
process and equal protection. The costs are usually borne by the pub-
lic treasury.
While the indigent's fight of access to the courts has been defini-
tively acknowledged, less than clear-cut guidelines have been promul-
gated for the resolution of some of the practical problems which have
been created in the process. A recent Appellate Division, First Depart-
ment, decision underscores this problem. In Jackson v. Jackson,59 a
divorce action, the trial court had "direct[ed] the Treasurer of the
City of New York to pay the costs and expenses of service by publica-
tion ...... ,,0 The appellate division reversed, declaring that
[n]o provision of the law has beeh called to our attention which
authorizes the City to make such payment in a matrimonial action
in behalf of an indigent plaintiff.'
Prior to this decision, it had become evident that "the burden of
56 67 Misc. 2d 747, 325 N.Y.S.2d 616 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1971).
571d. at 748, 325 N.YS.2d at 618.
Sold. See 7B McKrNNEY's CPLR 509, commentary at 42 (1963).
59 37 App. Div. 2d 953, 326 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Ist Dep't 1971).
0d. at -, 326 N.Y..2d at 225.
61 Id. An argument to the contrary can be made. CPLR 1102(b) provides that:
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the required publication expenses [was] being transferred to the pub-
lic."62 Dorsey v. City of New York63 and Jeffreys v. Jeffreys64 clearly
indicated so. In both of these cases the court directed the city to pay
the cost of publication "because otherwise the plaintiff's right to equal
protection [and due process] would be violated." 65
The United States Supreme Court, in Boddie v. Connecticut,66
has also considered the problem of publication fees in divorce actions.
That Court did not mandate that publication fees should be paid by
the state, but rather offered the alternative methods of "service at de-
fendant's last known address by mail and posted notice" if the state
failed to arrange for publication.67 It must be noted that the court in
Jackson did not maintain that the indigent plaintiff was not entitled
to payment of the publication fees.68 It simply contended that if they
are to be paid, the state should bear the expense absent legislation to
the contrary.6 9
The idea that the state and not the city should bear the costs of
publication is an appealing one. The contract of marriage is a tripar-
tite agreement among the husband, the wife and the state. Why then
should the local government be required to finance the action for in-
digents when rescission of this contract is sought? This expense should
be borne by the state as the other party to the agreement. Indeed, the
mandate of the Supreme Court in Boddie was directed to the state.
Lastly, the reimbursement section, CPLR 1102(d), merely states
that the city should be reimbursed for any money expended under
subdivision (b), which deals with stenographic costs.
A poor person shall not be liable for the payment of any costs or fees unless a
recovery by judgment or by settlement is had in his favor...
The court's conclusion that this section does not include publication fees is not evident
from the language. It could conceivably be construed to include them.
62 The Quarterly Survey, 46 sr. JOHN's L. RFv. 147, 158 (1971).
63 66 Misc. 2d 464, 321 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 147, 158 (1971).
64 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S2d 74 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 498, 510 (1969). See also The Quarterly Survey,
46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 147, 158 (1971).
65 Note, Boddie and Beyond: Rights of the Indigent Civil Litigant, 18 CAr. LAW. No.
1 (1972).
66 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
67 Id. at 382; see La France, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 1971 DuKE L.J. 487, 532.
68 The court noted that CPLR 1102 does not apply to publication fees. This was also
the opinion of the court in the Jeffreys case, where it was declared that "the poor person's
statute (CPLR 1102) does not authorize the payment of the expense of publication." 58
Misc. 2d at 1050, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
69 But see McCandless v. McCandless, 88 App. Div. 2d 171, 327 N.Y.S.2d 896 (4th Dep't
1972), where the Fourth Department ordered a county to pay the costs of publication and
asserted that "the absence of specific provision of law relating to the source of payment of
publication costs for indigents does not permit our negating the mandate of Boddie." Id.
at 173, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
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The decision in Jackson in effect overrules in part the Dorsey
case.70 It does not, however, undermine the basic constitutional argu-
ment stated therein.
Scrutiny of the New York service statutes in relation to matrimo-
nial actions indicates possible constitutional deficiencies. CPLR 308
provides for personal service in matrimonial actions; CPLR 315 pro-
vides that if personal service cannot be accomplished, service can be
made by publication. Should personal service and publication consti-
tute the only available alternatives in this area?
The Supreme Court in Boddie envisioned a middle ground. The
Court maintained that "service at defendant's last known address by
mail and posted notice is equally effective as publication in a news-
paper."'71 It is a basic tenet of due process that a "defendant must be
given a 'reasonable' form of notice' 72 and that "publication alone is
the weakest form of notice and may not meet constitutional standards.
. . .,,"73 Why then, in a matrimonial action, should a plaintiff unable
to effect personal service be forced to bear the expense of publication?
It may be argued that CPLR 308 is not constitutionally deficient due
to subdivision (5), which gives the court power to allow service in any
manner "if service is impractical under [paragraphs] one . . . .... 74
Nevertheless, it is evident that legislative reconsideration of service
in matrimonial actions is necessary.
ARTICLE 12- INFANTS AND INCOMPETENTS
CPLR 1201: Protecting the adult incompetent.
It has long been held that no judgment may be entered against
an infant defendant for whom no guardian ad litem has been ap-
pointed.75 Clearly, justice requires that this same rule be applied with
respect to adult incompetents.7 In Oneida National Bank & Trust
70 The court in Dorsey concluded:
Petitioner's poverty justifies a direction that the City of New York must pay for
the cost of publication so that she can avail herself of her constitutional right to
access to the court.
66 Misc. 2d at 466, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 121.
71401 U.S. at 382.
72 7B McKmizNa's CPLR 308, commentary at 213 (1972).
73 71B McKINNEY's CPLR 315, commentary at 329 (1972). See Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), where it was held that notice by publication and posting prior
to a condemnation proceeding was violative of due process. See also Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank 8- Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
74 CPLR 808(5).
75 See Ingersoll v. Mangam, 84 N.Y. 622 (1881); State Bank of Albany v. Murray, 27
App. Div. 2d 627, 275 N.Y.S.2d 985 (3d Dep't 1966) (mem.). See also 2 WK&M 309.01.
76 Oneida Natl Bank &- Trust Co. v. Unczur, 37 App. Div. 2d 480, 326 N.Y.S2d 458
(4th Dep't 1971), citing Rakiecki v. Ferenc, 21 App. Div. 2d 741, 250 N.Y.S.2d 102 (4th
Dep't 1964) (mem.) (wherein the court's failure to provide a guardian ad litem for the
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